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Abstract
For product rating environments, similar
to that of Amazon Reviews, it has been
shown that the truthful elicitation of feed-
back is possible through mechanisms which
pay buyer reports contingent on the reports
of other buyers. We study whether similar
mechanisms can be designed for reputation
mechanisms at online auction sites where the
buyers’ experiences are partially determined
by a strategic seller. We show that this is
impossible for the basic setting. However, in-
troducing a small prior belief that the seller
is a cooperative commitment player leads to
a payment scheme with a truthful perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
1 INTRODUCTION
Virtually every type of good is traded online: books
and electronic devices are ordered from Amazon1, used
items are traded on eBay2 and services are offered at
freelance portals, such as Elance3. Almost every e-
commerce site employs a so-called reputation mecha-
nism which collects and publishes ratings from their
customers and it is instructive to distinguish between
different kinds of reputation mechanisms in accordance
with the role they play: those that are employed by
online opinion forums, such as Amazon Reviews or
Ciao4, are built to eliminate asymmetric information.
They are called signaling mechanisms as they collect
and publish feedback about the quality of products
and thus signal the previously hidden quality to fu-
ture customers. This is different for the reputation
mechanisms employed at online auction sites, such as
1www.amazon.com
2www.ebay.com
3www.elance.com
4www.ciao.com
eBay. These mechanisms are called sanctioning as
they induce cooperation of the auction sellers through
a threat to sanction uncooperative behavior. The es-
sential distinction between these two roles of reputa-
tion mechanisms is the type of seller behavior: in sig-
naling settings, sellers differ in their abilities. That is,
some sellers are of higher quality than others. In sanc-
tioning settings, all sellers are equally able but have
a temptation to cheat as cooperation involves higher
costs.
A common feature of almost all reputation mecha-
nisms is the dependency on honest feedback. Most
mechanisms in the literature simply assume that feed-
back is reported honestly. From a game-theoretic point
of view, this assumption is problematic for two reasons:
the first is the customers’ motivation to participate at
all. The feedback procedure requires a buyer to regis-
ter an account, to log in and to fill out forms describing
her5 experiences. While this is time consuming and
thus costly, the reported information benefits other
customers but not the posting customer herself, so that
standard economic theory predicts an under-provision
of feedback. The second difficulty is honesty. External
interests, i. e. biases towards dishonest reporting, may
come from a variety of motivations. As an example
for online auction sites, imagine two sellers compet-
ing for the same group of customers. Either seller has
an incentive to badmouth its competitor, to praise his
own service or to pay a customer to do so. A par-
ticularly common issue at online auction sites with bi-
directional feedback, i. e. where both the seller and the
buyer can rate the transaction, is retaliatory feedback.
Empirical data of eBay’s pre-2008 reputation mecha-
nism suggests that sellers wait until the buyers have
posted their feedback and match it thereafter. That
is, sellers post the same rating they have received from
the buyers and, in particular, retaliate against nega-
tive feedback (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002).
5We refer to buyers and sellers as female and male, re-
spectively.
The truthful elicitation of feedback is thus crucial
to incorporate into the design of sanctioning repu-
tation mechanisms. This task is difficult because
both the sellers’ actions and the subsequent outcomes
are private information which are never publicly re-
vealed. One way to induce honest feedback in sig-
naling settings is to pay a buyer for her feedback
report conditional on the report of another buyer.
This so-called “peer prediction method” was intro-
duced by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2005) and
considerably extended by Jurca and Faltings (2006;
2009). With regard to truthful feedback elicitation,
signaling mechanisms are convenient because the per-
ceived quality is essentially identical for all customers.
Consider a digital camera bought via Amazon as an
example: while different customers may experience dif-
ferent quality levels due to noise, they all receive the
identical model. This is different for the customers’
signals at eBay as they primarily depend on the sell-
ers’ actions, i. e. whether or not the respective seller
sent the good in the prescribed quality. To our knowl-
edge, the only sanctioning reputation mechanism that
incorporates truthful feedback is the CONFESS mech-
anism developed by Jurca and Faltings (2007). Unfor-
tunately, as it resorts to the folk theorems to induce
cooperation, it inherits their dependency on repeated
interactions which rules out its application at online
auction sites.
In this paper, we study the mechanism design space
of peer-based feedback elicitation for eBay-like online
auctions. In the game-theoretic literature on sanction-
ing reputation mechanisms it is usually assumed that
feedback is honest and one then studies how the de-
gree of seller cooperation can be increased by tweaking
the design parameters. For example, Dellarocas (2005)
studies how the length of the feedback history influ-
ences seller cooperation. In this paper, we take the
complementary view and assume that we are given a
sanctioning mechanism which induces a certain degree
of seller cooperation under the assumption of honest
feedback. That is, for those settings for which we re-
trieve positive results, the feedback mechanisms which
we provide can be merged with a sanctioning mecha-
nism, such as the one developed by Dellarocas, into a
fully incentivized sanctioning reputation mechanism.
2 THE MODEL
Before we study the design space of feedback mech-
anisms for online auction sites, we explain the basic
procedure together with the game-theoretic model.
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Figure 1: The game tree for a single online auction game
with imperfect monitoring and noise parameter f(·| ·) with
0 < f(h| l) < f(h|h) < 1. Note that the given payoffs
are example numbers with the first and the second number
denoting the buyer’s and the seller’s payoff, respectively.
2.1 PROCEDURE
The idealized procedure of a single transaction is the
following: the seller describes the quality of a good
that he wants to sell and interested customers submit
their bids. At some point, the auction site determines
the buyer who subsequently pays for the good. After
reception of payment, the seller sends it in the pre-
scribed quality. Unfortunately, this idealized proce-
dure is prone to cheating: since the buyer of the good
has to pay for it before the seller sends it, the seller is
better off by cheating, i. e. either not sending the good
at all or in a quality that is lower than described. An-
ticipating this, the buyer does not pay for the good in
the first place. This is called a dilemma as it results
in a no-trade situation even if both buyer and seller
gained from trade if the seller could credibly commit
to cooperation. In the following, we restrict ourselves
to settings with numerous effort levels but only binary
signals. The interpretation of a signal is whether the
contract, i. e. the good’s description together with the
promise of sending it, was fulfilled. The procedure
with imperfect monitoring is depicted in Figure 1.
2.2 SELLER BEHAVIOR
We make the usual assumption for sanctioning mech-
anisms that the seller is a long-run player who faces a
sequence of short-run buyers, i. e. buyers who are in-
terested in the seller’s product in only a single stage
game. Every buyer plays a best response to the belief
of the seller’s action. That is, a buyer decides to pay
for the good if the belief that the seller will cooperate
is higher than a certain threshold.
In the usual literature on reputation mechanism de-
sign, the efficiency of a design is evaluated by deriv-
ing upper or lower bounds on the equilibrium pay-
off. One considers bounds instead of actual equilibria
because it is not always obvious which of the several
existing equilibria is chosen. In the following, we as-
sume that—given truthful feedback—the seller plays
the equilibrium that maximizes his payoff. This is
weakly justified as some of the low payoff equilibria
are unreasonable: once a buyer is asked for her feed-
back report, she is already in the subgame following
payment to the seller (compare again Figure 1). This
means that her belief of the subsequent seller action
must be sufficiently high as otherwise “pay” would not
have been a best response. However, it remains future
work to study both upper and lower bounds on the
seller strategies conditional on the subgame following
“pay” being reached.
Instead of assuming honest feedback and studying de-
sign parameters, we take the complementary view and
assume that we are given a sanctioning reputation
mechanism which induces a certain level of seller co-
operation under the assumption of honest feedback.
That is, the mechanism knows the seller’s strategy
given honest feedback by the buyers. The feedback
mechanism which we develop in this paper can then
be used by a sanctioning mechanism similar to a plug-
in in order to incorporate honest feedback.
2.3 COMMITMENT TYPES
Our game-theoretic model of the online auction setting
is that of Dellarocas (2005), extended by the possibil-
ity that players can be of cooperative “commitment”
types. Commitment types have a long history in the
game-theoretic literature on reputation building: for
example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) showed that—if
the long-run players’ actions are perfectly observed—a
small prior belief that the long-run player is commit-
ted to cooperation is sufficient to induce a “strategic”
long-run player to cooperate, as well. The intuition
behind this result is that a strategic player “masks”
as a commitment player, i. e. builds a reputation for
being cooperative. After a sufficiently long history of
cooperative play, the short-run players’ belief that the
long-run player is of a commitment type approaches 1
and they play a best response to cooperation. Fu-
denberg and Levine (1992) find a similar result for
settings where the long-run players’ actions are only
imperfectly observed as it is the case in the online auc-
tion game. Contrasting the perfectly observable case,
however, a strategic long-run player will occasionally
cheat as the noise prevents the immediate revelation
of his strategic nature. Cripps, Mailath and Samuel-
son (2004) show that in the long run these occasional
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Figure 2: The embedding of the Feedback Game.
plays of the cheating action eventually reveal the long-
run player’s strategic nature almost surely.
2.4 THE FEEDBACK GAME
Similar to the paper of Dellarocas in which he studies
how often a feedback profile should be updated (2006),
we subdivide the possibly infinite game into a sequence
of games (henceforth, Feedback Games) with only two
buyers. While these less frequent updates can gener-
ally lead to higher cooperation of strategic sellers, it is
crucial to note that it cannot prevent occasional cheats
by the seller in settings with imperfect monitoring of
outcomes.
The Feedback Game is an extensive game with both
incomplete and imperfect information. The set of play-
ers is
N = {seller, 1, 2} (1)
which denotes the seller, the first and the second buyer.
The game begins with a move by “nature” that chooses
the seller’s type θ, which is either “strategic” or “com-
mitment”:
θ ∈ Θ = {θs, θc}. (2)
Note that this move by “nature” is not an actual move
but used to model the buyers’ beliefs regarding the
seller’s type. That is, all agents share a common prior
belief Pr(θc) that the seller is of the commitment type
θc with Pr(θc) ≥ 0 and
Pr(θs) + Pr(θc) = 1. (3)
Once determined, the seller learns his own type which
stays fixed for the remainder of the game.
Following this move by nature, the seller decides on the
quality effort level for the first buyer which is followed
by a noisy signal which the buyer privately observes.
She is then asked to report a signal to the mechanism.
Thereafter, this procedure is repeated for the second
buyer. Once both reports are elicited, they can be
published. The buyers of the following Feedback Game
then hold a different prior belief with regard to the
seller’s type. We refer to Section 3 for an explanations
of their computation through Bayesian updating. See
Figure 2 for the embedding of the Feedback Game.
There are M levels of seller effort. To denote the ex-
erted quality effort for buyer i, we use the notation
qi ∈ Q = {q1, . . . , qM} (4)
with qM corresponding to full cooperation. High effort
is costlier for the seller than low effort.
Let si denote the signal received by buyer i
si ∈ S = {s1, s2} (5)
corresponding to a low and high signal, respectively.
Please note that we often write l and h instead of s1
and s2. The seller action influences buyer i’s signal
in that cooperation makes it more probable that the
signal is high. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible
that a high effort level results in a low signal. For
example, a seller may send the good as described, i. e.
he cooperates, but the package gets lost in the mail.
It is important to note that the seller cannot observe
the outcome of his action, e. g., whether the package
was lost. However, all players know the probability for
a certain signal given a certain effort level:
0 < f(h| qm) < 1 for all qm ∈ Q. (6)
Note that f(·| qm) is a probability distribution, so that
f(l| qm) = 1 − f(h|qm). Also, the noise parameters
are fully mixed, so that every signal has a probability
greater than 0 following any quality effort. Further-
more, higher effort makes a high signal strictly more
likely:
f(h| qm) > f(h| qm−1) for all m = 2, . . . ,M. (7)
Observe that the information that the seller has about
the state of the game does not change between his first
and his second move. He cannot observe the outcome
of his first move nor the buyer’s feedback report which
follows it. Therefore, coalescing his two moves into
a single one which combines the two original moves,
results in a strategically equivalent game. Henceforth,
we refer to this version of the game as the Feedback
Game and denote the seller actions for the first and
second buyer by
q12 = q1q2 (8)
Sellers of the commitment type always play qM . As
mentioned earlier, we also know a strategic seller’s
strategies under the assumption of truthful buyer feed-
back. We denote these by
q¯12 = q¯1q¯2 (9)
and refer to the probability that qm is played for buyer
i with Pr(q¯im). As mentioned earlier, Fudenberg and
Levine (1992) show that in settings with imperfectly
observed actions, the long-run player cheats occasion-
ally so that Pr(q¯iM ) < 1 for i = 1, 2.
To incorporate external benefits from lying and partic-
ipation costs, let ∆i(h) be the external benefit buyer
i could gain by falsely announcing signal h instead of
signal l, the one actually received (∆i(l) analogously).
We assume upper bounds
∆(sd) = max
i
∆i(sd) for sd = l, h (10)
on the individual external lying benefits. Furthermore,
let Ci be the costs reflecting buyer i’s time and effort
required for the rating process. Similar to the lying
benefits, we assume an upper bound
C = max
i
Ci (11)
on the individual participation costs.
3 MECHANISM FRAMEWORK
In order to elicit truthful feedback and induce seller
cooperation, we allow the mechanism to pay the buy-
ers for their feedback. Before we get to the description
of the payment scheme, we clarify the applied solution
concept and show how to compute the conditional be-
liefs that the payment scheme requires.
3.1 SOLUTION CONCEPT
In order to have a unifying solution concept for both
the seller (who shall cooperate) and the buyers (who
shall be truthful), we include the seller in the defini-
tion of truthfulness. We are aware that there are other
concepts that capture both information revelation and
robustness to rational manipulation. However, when
the monitoring of the outcomes is imperfect, it is not
possible to achieve full seller cooperation, and thus ro-
bustness to rational manipulation, even if feedback is
truthful. It is important to distinguish between the ob-
jectives of the sanctioning reputation mechanism and
the feedback mechanism: the sanctioning mechanism
(which we are given) induces some degree of seller
cooperation if feedback is truthful. The objective of
the feedback mechanism is to provide the sanctioning
mechanism with truthful buyer feedback. That is, in
noisy settings, the sanctioning mechanism can only in-
duce partial cooperation given truthful feedback while
the feedback mechanism can potentially elicit perfectly
truthful buyer feedback. Since faithfulness would im-
ply that the seller is fully cooperative in equilibrium,
it is not suited for our purpose and we side to include
the seller in the definition of truthfulness, instead.
Definition 1 (Truthfulness). An equilibrium is truth-
ful if and only if the seller plays q¯12 and both buyers
report their signal outcomes honestly.
The equilibrium concept we apply is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) as it generalizes both Nash and
subgame perfect equilibrium to extensive games with
incomplete information. If, in equilibrium, there were
information sets that are not reached, sequential equi-
librium would further restrict beliefs on these informa-
tion sets. However, the seller’s sole information set is
a singleton, i. e., at the time of his play, the seller has
no uncertainty about the state of the world, and since
f(·| ·) is fully mixed, every information set belonging to
a buyer is reached with positive probability. Put differ-
ently, no buyer is ever “surprised” by an information
set she encounters due to another player’s deviation
from equilibrium play. This has two other important
implications: firstly, the best response conditions for
truthfulness are not only necessary but sufficient for
a PBE as the signal a buyer receives is interpreted as
equilibrium play and, secondly, the Bayesian update of
the type prior to the type posterior is always possible.
3.2 BELIEF COMPUTATIONS
One way to check whether a strategy profile is a truth-
ful PBE is the following: pick out each player, fix the
remaining players’ strategies to truthfulness and check
whether truthful play by the picked-out player is a best
response. If the picked-out player is the seller, we have
the situation of truthful feedback for which we know
that the seller will play q¯12.
If the picked-out player is one of the buyers, the sit-
uation is more difficult. Without loss of generality,
let buyer i be the picked-out buyer and let us denote
the other buyer as r(i). For the best response con-
dition to hold, it must be true that—given the seller
plays q¯12 and buyer r(i) is truthful—buyer i is also
truthful. To achieve this, we allow the mechanism to
pay buyer i for her feedback and condition the pay-
ment on the feedback report of r(i). For pure signaling
mechanisms (without a strategic seller), this so-called
“peer prediction method” by Miller, Resnick and Zeck-
hauser (2005) has been used extensively to derive a
fair number of mechanisms (Jurca and Faltings 2006;
2009, e. g.). To our knowledge, however, we are the
first to study its application to sanctioning mecha-
nisms. See Figure 3 for the procedure of a single Feed-
back Game.
For the moment, we assume that buyer i has an incen-
tive to report a signal. Let
ai = (ai1, a
i
2) (12)
be her reporting strategy, such that she reports signal
aij ∈ S if she received sj . The honest strategy, i. e.
always reporting the signal she received, is:
a¯i = (s1, s2) = (l, h). (13)
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Figure 3: The feedback procedure for a single Feedback
Game.
After buyer i has reported a signal to the mechanism,
it is compared to the report of buyer r(i). Let sr(i) =
sk and si = sj denote the signals received by buyer r(i)
and buyer i, respectively. For her report, she receives
a payment
τ i(aij , a
r(i)
k ) (14)
that depends on both her own report aij and the re-
port of the other buyer ar(i)k . We describe how these
payments are computed in Section 4.
The central idea behind the comparison of two sig-
nal reports is that knowing one of the received signals
should tell you something about the other. The prob-
ability that buyer r(i) received sk given i received sj
is defined as:
gi(sk| sj) = Pr(sr(i) = sk| si = sj). (15)
After receiving her signal, buyer i’s expected payment
is thus given by Equation 16.
E(aij = sd|si = sj) =
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj) τ i(sd, sk). (16)
In the following equations, we slightly abuse the no-
tation and write qim for q
i = qm, i. e. the event that
the seller exerts effort qm for buyer i (analogously for
buyer r(i)). We also write θc instead of θ = θc (anal-
ogously for θs). The signal posterior gi(sk| sj) can be
computed with Equation 17:
gi(sk| sj) =
M∑
m=1
f(sk|qm) · Pr(qr(i)m |si = sj). (17)
The probability of a specific seller effort level played
for buyer r(i) given the signal perceived by buyer i is
obtained by Bayes’ law:
Pr(qr(i)m |si = sj) = Pr(s
i = sj |qr(i)m ) · Pr(qr(i)m )
Pr(si = sj)
. (18)
The prior signal probability for buyer i is:
Pr(si = sj) =
M∑
m=1
f(sj |qm) · Pr(qim). (19)
The prior probability for a specific seller effort level
played for buyer i which is required for Equations 18,
19 and 24 can be computed with Equation 20:
Pr(qim) = Pr(q
i
m|θc) · Pr(θc)
+Pr(qim|θs) · Pr(θs).
(20)
The values for Pr(qim|θ) are derived with either of the
two following equations:
Pr(qim|θc) =
{
1, if m = M
0, else
(21)
and
Pr(qim|θs) = Pr(q¯im). (22)
For Equation 18, we require Pr(si = sj |qr(i)m ). At first
sight, it may seem that the probability of the seller
effort level for buyer r(i) is independent of the other
buyer’s signal. However, the materialized qr(i) tells
us something about the seller’s type which, in turn,
influences buyer i’s signal:
Pr(si = sj |qr(i)m ) = Pr(si = sj |θc) · Pr(θc|qr(i)m )
+Pr(si = sj |θs) · Pr(θs|qr(i)m ).
(23)
The type probability knowing the seller’s effort level
for a certain buyer is again computed by Bayes’ law:
Pr(θ|qr(i)m ) = Pr(q
r(i)
m |θ) · Pr(θ)
Pr(q
r(i)
m )
. (24)
Finally, Equation 25 shows how to obtain the proba-
bility for a signal knowing the seller’s type.
Pr(si = sj |θ) =
M∑
m=1
f(sj |qm) · Pr(qim|θ). (25)
We can now compute the signal posterior gi(sk| sj)
and with it the expected payment to buyer i given
truthfulness by both buyer r(i) and the seller.
The Bayesian update for the type beliefs, once the two
signals are elicited (compare Figure 2), are computed
with Equation 26 (using Equations 19 and 25):
Pr(θ|si = sj) = Pr(s
i = sj |θ) · Pr(θ)
Pr(si = sj)
. (26)
It is easy to see that with a fully mixed f(·| ·), and
a positive prior probability for both types in the first
Feedback Game, both type probabilities stay positive
for every Feedback Game that follows.
4 THE PAYMENT SCHEME
We follow Jurca and Faltings (2006) and formulate the
payment scheme as a Linear Program (LP) that mini-
mizes the required budget. The technique of solving a
mechanism design problem using mathematical opti-
mization is called Automated Mechanism Design and
was first introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm (2002).
4.1 THE LINEAR PROGRAM
The constraints of the LP are divided into two groups.
The first group consists of the honesty constraints
which require that an honest signal announcement by
buyer i is the single best response to a truthful report
by r(i) and a truthful seller. For every possible signal
observation si = sj ∈ S, there exists a dishonest an-
nouncement aij 6= a¯j . We want the expected payment
of a truthful report by agent i to be larger than the
expected payment of the other possible report. More
accurately, incorporating external lying incentives, we
want it to be larger by a margin greater than the re-
spective ∆(·). Note that the buyer’s valuation for a
signal can be left out as the received signal is indepen-
dent of the signal announcement :
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj)
(
τ i(sj , sk)− τ i(sd, sk)
)
> ∆(sd).
∀sj , sd ∈ S, sj 6= sd
(27)
The second group consists of the participation or in-
dividual rationality (IR) constraints. A rational buyer
will only give feedback if she is remunerated with at
least as much as the rating process costs her. In or-
der to avoid indifference between participation and ab-
sence we demand that, at the time of her participation
decision, the agent receives an expected payment that
is higher than C. Since the buyers decide whether to
participate only after they have experienced the prod-
uct, i. e. after they received their signal, participation
needs to be better than non-participation given any of
the two possible signal observations (interim IR):
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj) · τ i(sj , sk) > C, ∀sj ∈ S. (28)
As mentioned earlier, the objective of the mechanism is
to minimize its required budget. Please note that tech-
nically we can only achieve a very good approxima-
tion of the required budget as we have strict inequali-
ties in our constraints. The budget B is the expected
payment given a certain signal weighted with the sig-
nal’s prior probability. Together with the assumption
that there is no possibility to withdraw credit from
the agents, so that all payments are non-negative, the
summarized payment scheme formulated as an LP is
LP 1. Note that we have to add a small  > 0 to the
right side of both the honesty and participation con-
straints as the definition of Linear Programs does not
include strict inequalities.
LP 1.
min . B =
2∑
j=1
Pr(sj)
(
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj) · τ i(sj , sk)
)
s. t.
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj)
(
τ i(sj , sk)− τ i(sd, sk)
)
≥ ∆(sd) + 
∀sj , sd ∈ S, sj 6= sd
2∑
k=1
gi(sk| sj) · τ i(sj , sk) ≥ C +  ∀sj ∈ S
τ i(sj , sk) ≥ 0; ∀sj , sk ∈ S
4.2 FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
It is clear that LP 1 is bounded since all factors in
the objective function are non-negative. To study if
and when it is feasible, we firstly prove three lemmas
that eventually enable us to prove our main statement
that LP 1 is feasible if and only if both seller types
have prior probability greater 0. The intuition for this
result is that a buyer’s belief about another buyer’s ex-
perience does not change if there is only a single seller
type whose strategies are commonly held a-priori.
Lemma 1. LP 1 is feasible if and only if gi(h|h) 6=
gi(h| l) for i = 1, 2.
Proof. For reasons of clarity, we omit the letter i. We
first reduce the feasibility of LP 1 to the feasibility of
its honesty constraints with no external lying benefits:
FP 1.
2∑
k=1
g(sk| sj) · τ(sj , sk)−
2∑
k=1
g(sk| sj) · τ(sd, sk) ≥ 
∀sj , sd ∈ S, sj 6= sd
We proceed by transforming a feasible solution of FP 1
into a feasible solution of LP 1 and begin with in-
corporating ∆(sd). Let ′ denote the maximal of all
possible  which corresponds to FP 1’s “honesty mar-
gin”. As expected utility is invariant to affine trans-
formations, we can multiply τ(·, ·) with a constant fac-
tor γ without changing the incentive properties. Let
∆′ = maxd ∆(sd) denote the maximal external lying
benefit. We choose γ = ∆
′
′ , so that after multiplying
τ(·, ·) with γ, the resulting feasibility program incor-
porates all external lying benefits.
If the minimal τ(sj , sk) is negative, let τ ′ denote its
absolute value. Incorporating participation costs C
and ensuring that all τ(sj , sk) are positive is done by
adding τ ′ + C +  to all τ(sj , sk). As mentioned, ex-
pected utility is invariant to affine transformations, so
that adding a constant does not change the agents’
incentives.
We change the right side of the inequality from “≥ ”
to “> 0”, so that the two honesty constraints can be
written as:
g(h|h) (τ(h, h)− τ(l, h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=τ1
+g(l|h) (τ(h, l)− τ(l, l))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=τ2
> 0
g(l| l) (τ(l, l)− τ(h, l))︸ ︷︷ ︸
−τ2
+g(h| l) (τ(l, h)− τ(h, h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
−τ1
> 0.
Rewriting g(l|h) = 1− g(h|h) and g(l| l) = 1− g(h| l)
and multiplying the second line by −1, we obtain:
g(h|h)τ1 + τ2 − g(h|h)τ2 > 0
g(h| l)τ1 + τ2 − g(h| l)τ2 < 0.
It is obvious that if g(h|h) = g(h| l), no assign-
ment that satisfies both constraints can be found. If
g(h|h) > g(h| l), pick a value g′ so that g(h|h) > g′ >
g(h| l) and assign τ1 = 1− g′ and τ2 = −g′. We show
that this assignment satisfies both constraints:
g(h|h)(1− g′)− g′ + g(h|h) · g′
=g(h|h)− g(h|h) · g′ − g′ + g(h|h) · g′
=g(h|h)− g′ > 0
and
g(h| l)(1− g′)− g′ + g(h| l) · g′
=g(h| l)− g′ < 0
The case g(h| l) > g′ > g(h|h) is analogous with τ1 =
g′ − 1 and τ2 = g′.
We require two other lemmas for the proposition.
Lemma 2. Pr(si = h|θc) > Pr(si = h) > Pr(si =
h|θs) if 0 < Pr(θc) < 1.
Proof. Sellers of the commitment type always play
full cooperation, so that Pr(si = h|θc) = f(h| qM ).
Sellers of the strategic type play Pr(si = h|θs) =∑M
m=1 f(h|qm)·Pr(q¯im) (Equations 22 and 25). It then
follows from f(h| qM ) > f(h| qM−1) and Pr(q¯iM ) < 1
that Pr(si = h|θc) > Pr(si = h|θs). The state-
ment then follows from Pr(si = h) = Pr(si =
h|θs) · Pr(θs) + Pr(si = h|θc) · Pr(θc).
Using Lemma 2 we can then prove Lemma 3:
Lemma 3. Pr(θc| si = h) > Pr(θc| si = l) for i = 1, 2
if 0 < Pr(θc) < 1.
Proof.
Pr(θc| si = h) =Pr(θc) · Pr(s
i = h|θc)
Pr(si = h)
>Pr(θc) · Pr(s
i = h)
Pr(si = h)
=Pr(θc)
>Pr(θc) · Pr(s
i = l|θc)
Pr(si = l)
=Pr(θc| si = l)
We can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4. LP 1 is feasible if and only if 0 <
Pr(θc) < 1.
Proof. First, we show that from either Pr(θc) = 0 or
Pr(θc) = 1, it follows that g(h|h) = g(h|l). Thereafter,
we show that assuming both g(h|h) = g(h|l) and 0 <
Pr(θc) < 1 leads to a contradiction.
If Pr(θc) = 0, the signal received by buyer r(i) is sim-
ply Pr(sr(i) = sk|θs) =
∑M
m=1 f(sk|qm) ·Pr(q¯r(i)m ) and
thus independent of the signal received by buyer i and,
in particular, it thus holds that g(h|h) = g(h|l). Sim-
ilarly, Pr(θc) = 1 implies that buyer r(i) receives a
high signal with probability f(h|qM ) which is also in-
dependent of the signal received by buyer i.
Let us then assume that both g(h|h) = g(h|l) and
0 < Pr(θc) < 1 holds. These are contradictory:
g(h|h) = Pr(sr(i) = h| θc) · Pr(θc|si = h)
+Pr(sr(i) = h| θs) · Pr(θs|si = h)
=f(h| qM ) · Pr(θc|si = h) + Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
−Pr(sr(i) = h| θs) · Pr(θc|si = h)
=Pr(θc|si = h)
(
f(h| qM )− Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
)
+Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
>Pr(θc|si = l)
(
f(h| qM )− Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
)
+Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
=f(h| qM ) · Pr(θc|si = l) + Pr(sr(i) = h| θs)
−Pr(sr(i) = h| θs) · Pr(θc|si = l)
=Pr(sr(i) = h| θc) · Pr(θc|si = l)
+Pr(sr(i) = h| θs) · Pr(θs|si = l) = g(h| l) 
Corollary 5. If both seller types have prior probability
greater than 0 and every buyer is paid for her report ac-
cording to payments computed by LP 1, truthfulness is
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the Feedback Game.
If LP 1 is feasible and bounded, the proof follows im-
mediately from the design of the payment scheme.
5 CONCLUSION
We have shown that the peer prediction method can
be used to design a truthful feedback scheme for sanc-
tioning mechanisms. Drawing on the literature on
game theory and reputation building, we introduced
a commitment type seller who is fully cooperative and
showed that its presence is critical for the method’s
applicability.
In future work, we will reduce the common knowledge
assumptions of our mechanism. In particular, we will
modify the payment scheme to allow for bounds on
the probabilistic parameters instead of the (possibly
unknown) specific numbers. For example, it should be
sufficient to know that high seller effort is followed by
a high signal with probability of at least 90%. Another
difficulty with regard to the mechanism’s application
is the assumption of a long-lived seller. We will thus
study mechanisms that no longer rely on a long history
of past feedback reports but instead pay a seller an
amount directly dependent on the reported quality and
only after the transaction.
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